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CML RIGIITS-DUE PROCEss-ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY BASED ON
SECTION 1983-In an action for damages based on sections 1983 and
1985 of the Civil Rights Act, plaintiff alleged that a county health officer and his deputy, pursuant to a conspiracy, forcibly took plaintiff
to a mental hospital and confined him there for a period of two
months in willful violation of a state court order requiring plaintiff
to be brought before the court for a sanity hearing. Plaintiff also alleged a false return of citation to the court by the officers and an intentional suppression of facts by the officers and the examining physician
regarding plaintiff's illegal detention. Plaintiff contended that these allegations stated a cause of action for civil conspiracy to obstruct the due
course of justice in violation of section 1985 (2), to deny plaintiff equal
protection of the laws in violation of section 1985 (3), and to deprive
plaintiff under color of state law of rights, privileges, and immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws in violation of section 1983. The
district court dismissed the action for failure to state a cause of action. On
appeal, held, reversed., Section 1983 will support a cause of action against
all the members of a conspiracy for acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
and which under color of state law deprive the plaintiff of due process
of law. Hoffman v. Halden, (9th Cir. 1959) 268 F. (2d) 280.

1 The dismissal of the action as against the superintendent of the state mental hospital, however, was affirmed because he enjoyed the immunity of a jailor in detaining
the plaintiff and because his authority to release the plaintiff was a discretionary function
for which he also enjoyed immunity from civil liability. Principal case at 300. See,
generally, Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 185; Francis v. Lyman, (1st
Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 588.
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Sections 19832 and 1985 (3)3 of the Civil Rights Act fit into the scheme
of federal protection of civil rights as the general provisions for civil relief. Section 1983, commonly called the state action section, gives a cause
of action in law or equity to any person within the jurisdiction of the
United States for deprivation, under color of state law, of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution or laws.
Section 1985 (3), commonly called the conspiracy section, gives a cause of
action in law for injury caused by an act done in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive any person or class of persons of equal protection of
the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. The
two sections remain in substantially the same form as they appeared in
1871 when passed by the 42nd Congress as part of the Civil War Reconstruction legislation.4 Shortly after their enactment, the two sections entered into an extended period of dormancy. Any incentive to
rely on these sections had apparently suffered from the series of Supreme
Court decisions limiting the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, from
which the sections draw their real vitality. The late 1930's marked the
end of the dormancy period and the beginning of a continuing increase
in litigation based on the two sections.5 But, at present, the usefulness
of the conspiracy section is questionable. Its criminal counterpart in
6
the Act of 1871 was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Harris

242 U.S.C. (1958) §1983: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
342 U.S.C. (1958) §1985(3): "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; . . . In any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by each
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." Section 1985(1), relating to conspiracies to prevent an officer from performing his duties, and §1985 (2),
relating to conspiracies to obstruct justice, will not be discussed because of their more
limited scope. Section 1986 is the same as §1985 (3) except that §1986 applies to an action
for neglect to prevent.
4 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The words "and laws" were added to the language of §1983
in Rev. Stat. §1979 for the purpose of extending the purview of §1983 to rights and
privileges created by congressional act. See note, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 1285 (1953).
5 For a full development of the history of the two sections, see Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," 50 MicH. L. Rav. 1323 (1952); Poole, "Statutory Remedies for the Protection of Civil Rights," 32 ORE. L. Rv. 210 (1953); note, 66
HA v. L. Rlv. 1285 (1953); comment, 26 IND. L. J. 361 (1951); CARR, FEDEaRAL PROTECrION
OF Crvi. RGHTs (1947); KONVrrz, THE CONSTrrInON AND CIvM RIGHTS (1947).

6 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
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because it did not contain the requisite state action element necessary
for violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
section 1985 (3) is deficient in the same respect
Section 1983, although
not in peril constitutionally, is the subject of some discord among the
lower federal courts with regard to its proper scope. The discord stems
from two different approadhes to construction of the section. A number
of courts have limited section 1983 with the language of section 1985 (3),
treating the two sections as in pari materia. Other courts have construed
section 1983 on its own terms, treating the two sections as having significance independent of each other. In the principal case the court was
presented with a problem of determining whether section 1983 would
support an action for civil conspiracy. At least one court has taken the
"in pari materia" approach to this particular question, holding that because section 1985 (3) expressly mentions civil conspiracy while section
1983 does not, there cannot be an action for civil conspiracy based on section 1983.s The court in the principal case rejected this approach and
directed its attention to the language of section 1983 and the meaning
of "civil conspiracy," concluding that the civil injury which results from
action taken pursuant to a civil conspiracy is the cause of action and
that those who cooperate to produce the injury are all equally liable in
an action for civil conspiracy in the same manner as joint tortfeasors.9
The court found nothing in the language of section 1983 to preclude
an action for civil conspiracy when the resulting civil injury is clearly
within the purview of section 1983.10 The court also discussed the issue
7A more recent indication of the possible unconstitutionality of §1985(3) is found
in the majority opinion of Justice Jackson in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 at 659
(1951) where Justice Jackson stated, "It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act [section 1985 (3)], it raises constitutional problems of the first
magnitude that, in the light of history, are not without difficulty. These would include
issues as to congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the
reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as distinguished
from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to
those two classes of rights." Since the Court found that the complaint did not meet the
requirements of §1985 (3), the constitutional issue was not reached.
8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took this position in Eaton v. Bibb,
(7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 446, cert. den. 350 U.S. 915 (1955), and in Jennings v. Nester,
(7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 153.
9 Principal case at 293-296.
10 Ibid. Although there is no authority in accord, several cases holding aiders and
abettors liable under §1983 lend support. Baldwin v. Morgan, (5th Cir. 1958) 251 F.
(2d) 780; Valle v. Stengel, (3d Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 697. See also Lewis v. Brautigam, (5th
Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 124; McShane v. Moldovan, (6th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 1016;
Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240. The differences between
the civil meanings of "aider and abettor," "joint tortfeasor," and "conspirator" is more a
matter of semantics than of substance. The same principle of vicarious liability underlies all three terms, i.e., all those who cooperate to produce a tortious injury should be
held equally liable. See PRossEm, TORTS, 2d ed., 234 (1955). Although the term "joint
tortfeasor" in the procedural setting now often includes defendants who, acting independently, contributed to the civil injury, the original civil concept of "aiding and
abetting," "joint tort," and "conspiracy" required concerted action. It should also be
noted that the civil concept of conspiracy is quite different from the criminal concept.
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whether section 1983 can support a cause of action for denial of equal
protection. Although this discussion was obiter dictum," it serves to illustrate further the general approach used by the court in the construction of section 1983. On this issue also there is a line of cases following
the "in pari materia" approach. These cases reason that section 1983
does not give a cause of action for denial of equal protection because
such a cause of action is expressly provided under section 1985 (8).j2
The court in the principal case, however, took the position that the
broad language of section 1983 encompasses all of section (1) of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 3 This position is supported by the majority of
cases.14 In support of the general approach which treats sections 1983
and 1985 (3)independently, it should be recognized that such treatment
is in accordance with the separate and distinct purposes which the sections were originally intended to have. Section 1985 (3), known at the time
of its enactment as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was directed against discriminatory practices by groups of private persons.' 5 This historic purpose is evidenced by the language of the section which requires, without
mention of color of state law, a conspiracy of two or more persons and a
denial of equal protection or equal privileges or immunities. Section
1983, on the other hand, was intended to have a much broader scope.
Its original purpose was to provide civil relief for violation under color
of state law of any and all civil rights secured by the Constitution against
invasion by state authority.16 This purpose is evidenced by the language
of section 1988 which broadly refers to deprivation under color of state
law of "any rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws."' 7 The existence of these separate and distinct purposes
While under the criminal concept of conspiracy the conspiracy itself may be a crime without an overt act, under the civil concept the cause of action is the tortious injury and
without an overt act causing such injury there is no cause of action. James v. Evans,
(3d Cir. 1906) 149 F. 136; principal case at 295. See also Collins v. Hardyman, note 7
supra, at 659. In view of these considerations it would not seem proper to deny an action
for civil conspiracy based on section 1983 because the plaintiff worded his complaint in
terms of "conspiracy" instead of the all inclusive term "joint tort."
IlThe court held that the complaint stated a cause of action for deprivation of due
process of law. Principal case at 298.
12Eaton v. Bibb, note 8 supra; Jennings v. Nester, note 8 supra; McShane v. Moldovan, note 10 supra; Bottone v. Lindsley, (10th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 705.
18 Principal case at 294.
14 E.g., Agnew v. City of Compton, (9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 226; Lewis v. Brautigain, note 10 supra; Morris v. Williams, (8th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 703. The leading
authority is Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) in
which he said at 526, "It will be observed that the cause of action, given by the section in
its original as well as its final form, extends broadly to deprivation by state action of the
rights, privileges and immunities secured to persons by the Constitution. It thus includes the Fourteenth Amendment and such privileges and immunities as are secured by
the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as by the privileges and immunities
clause of that Amendment."
35 See the authorities cited in note 5 supra.
16 Ibid. See also note, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 224 (1955).
17 See the excerpt in note 14 supra from Justice Stone's opinion in Hague v. CIO.
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clearly refutes any suggestion that section 1983 should be unnecessarily
limited by being read in pari materiawith section 1985 (3).
James B. Blanchard

